A Case Study in Renaissance Diplomacy: The Agreement between Innocent VIII and Bayezid II regarding Djem Sultan

A REVIEW OF THE TURKISH SOURCES

When modern historians refer to the Ottoman sources on Djem Sultan they usually give priority to Sa'deddin, who submitted to Sultan Murad III in 1584 his Tādj al-Tawārikh, a history of the Ottoman Empire to the end of Selim I’s reign in 1520. The principal source, however, on which Sa’deddin drew his information, is a biography of Djem, Waki’at-i Sultan Djem, written by one of his intimates who accompanied him in his exile to his death. It is a simple and faithful story, and undoubtedly, the most detailed and reliable account of Djem’s life. It was written in the year 920/1514 when Selim I, son of Bayezid II, had recently overcome his rival brothers. The author concealed his name.

A modified version of the same work with a new title, Ghurbetnâme-i Sultan Djem, was made under Süleyman I. The author of this work provides a completely different story about Djem’s death, and inserts, quite awkwardly, a long controversy on Islam and Christianity which supposedly took place between Djem and the Pope. Otherwise, the work is simply a copy of Waki’at.

Sa’deddin’s second source on Djem Sultan was Idris’ Hasht Bihisht. Sa’deddin added to Waki’at. Idris’ account on Djem’s death. Hakim al-Din Idris al-Bidfisi wrote, upon Bayezid’s order, a general Ottoman history down to the year 915/1509. It appears that Idris’ main source on Djem was Mustafa (Mustafâ Pasha), who was grand vizir at the imperial council when Idris was writing his history. In 1489-90 Mustafa, then a kapudji-bashi, was sent to Pope Innocent VIII as an ambassador. Here is a summary translation of what Idris tells us about Djem Sultan:

The Grand Master of the Hospitalers (hakim-i Rodos) sent Djem Çelebi to the Pope, who is the leader of the Kings in Europe and head of the Christians. The Pope guarded him in Rome, and saw to it that no one Muslim or non-Muslim could have contact with Djem. He made this matter the means to establish friendly relations with Bayezid, the Sultan of Ghâzîs, so that hostility was replaced by agreement between Islam and Christendom. Since the city of Rome was too far away no news had been received for a long time about Djem’s life or death. The Sultan, who is compassionate, became distressed. He, therefore, decided to send Mustafa to Rome in order to ascertain the truth of the situation. To quote directly from Idris: ‘Mustafa Paşa, who is now a vizir of high esteem, was at that time a hâdîjî ahudijdâb at the Sultan’s palace and a loyal man to whom the Sultan entrusted all his important affairs, open or secret.’ After the hazards of the trip on land and sea he reached Rome. By relating the messages of the Sultan, he was able to bring the Pope into a conciliatory mood. The Pope permitted him to see Djem in the palace where he was kept confined (‘mahbûs ve mazbût’). He heard from Djem’s mouth his complaints of homesickness and his request of forgiveness from his elder brother and Sultan of Islam. After that Mustafa brought up with the Pope the matters which the Sultan had entrusted him to negotiate. And he consolidated with the Pope by documents and oaths which are acceptable according to the Christian practice the ties of agreement and compact. The most important point on which both sides agreed to honor their pledge was to keep Djem guarded and not to let him fall upon Islamic territories as long as the Sultan and Pope lived. In return the Sultan promised to never attack him and to consider the Pope one of the rulers with whom the Sultan was in compact and agreement. This sworn agreement remained intact for a period until the time when the French King rebelled against the Pope, occupied several countries in Italy, and planned an Invasion of Muslim lands. He demanded Djem from the Pope. ‘Since the Pope considered himself in religious and worldly affairs the highest authority (khâlîfe = caliph) and successor to Jesus Christ he always rejected the request of the king in order not to infringe upon the agreement solemnly sworn with the Sultan.’ Then, the French King
Rome, preferred spread apparently century. This belief mate one. Based on there...behavior of the French King, the Pope wanted to retaliate. ‘It is a widely circulated rumor that the Pope secretly instructed a man who came into Djem Sultan’s service as a tellak (bath attendant) and chief barber secretly to place a deadly poison at the back of the razor. When he shaved Djem Çelebi with this poisoned razor it caused a fatal disease and the demise of Djem, who until that time had been a healthy and strong man. He died in this way in the company of the King of France, and, thus, the King’s evil plans and ideas came to nothing. When the news of Djem Sultan’s death reached Ottoman lands, the Sultan sent agents to the Christian lands to verify the matter. The European kings sent the corpse of Djem Sultan to the Ottoman lands to be buried in his ancestors’ graveyard in the year 907/1501 (sic). Upon the arrival of the corpse, those people of evil intention both in the country and abroad in Christian and Islamic countries now took a loyal course.

Based on the information supplied by Mustafa Paşa, Idris’ account obviously reflects the Paşa’s personal views: the hazards of his trip to Rome, the great importance of the peace treaty concluded with the Pope, etc. The account of Djem being poisoned by Pope Alexander VI apparently came from Mustafa, since this report was the most widely spread rumor in Italy about Djem’s death, and Mustafa must have preferred it. Even if Mustafa was involved in the conspiracy against Djem, he could not confess it publicly. There was nothing contrary to law or custom in Djem’s claim to the Sultanate, though he was the younger brother of Bayezid II. In the Turco-Mongol world there was no definite rule or custom for the succession to the throne. Whatever circumstances eventually brought one of the sons of the deceased ruler to the throne, it was regarded as ordained by divine wisdom. The actual ruler was recognized legitimate as long as he was capable of maintaining himself on the throne. This belief was still strong with the Ottoman Turks in the fifteenth century. What made Djem different from previous pretenders was that in 1481, upon the death of Mehmed II, he had occupied the first Ottoman capital, Bursa, and struck silver coins in his name, which were considered symbols of sovereignty, making him, at least for a time, an Ottoman Sultan. After his flight, Djem Sultan continued to have supporters and sympathizers, including members of the military who for promotion and booty wanted the continuation of the Conqueror’s aggressive war policy, and dissident and discontented elements in Ottoman society who always supported pretenders to the throne. Also, Djem had the reputation of being better qualified and prepared for rulership, and was preferred by the Conqueror as his successor to the throne. Bayezid was aware of widespread pro-Djem feelings in the country, and he, in his turn, sought to create for himself an image of a Sultan abiding by religious law and justice: he therefore returned the wakf and mulk lands confiscated under Mehmed II, a policy which satisfied and won the support of the higher members of the ruling class and men of religion, including mystic orders. Besides, the Ottomans had suffered so much during internecine wars between the sons and grandsons of Bayezid I (1389-1402), that Ottoman society was in general against the unstable situation created by pretenders to the throne. Once Bayezid II firmly established himself on the throne, the Ottomans, in general, felt that they had to support him, as Tursun Beg put it, for the sake of peace and order and predominance of the Shari’a in society. It was in a similar atmosphere that Mehmed the Conqueror had included the following provision in his law book: “It is appropriate for anyone from among my sons to whom the Sultanate befalls to eliminate his brothers for the sake of the good and order of the state and society (nizâm-i ‘âlem); a majority of the doctors of law found this permissible (dja‘iž).”

The reaction to Djem’s death in the Ottoman country is also illustrative. While some could not refrain from expressing their sorrow for the unfortunate prince, the majority shared a feeling of relief from the danger of an internecine war and invasion of a crusader’s army, some citing the saying attributed to the Prophet: “Civil war is definitely worse than execution [of trouble makers].”

Djem’s transfer from French territory to Rome to be put directly under the Pope’s custody was considered in Istanbul as the beginning of the crusade and caused alarm. Thus, Bayezid II, sending an envoy to Rhodes, declared the transfer of Djem to Rome a breach of the pact between the Porte and the Order, and took a threatening attitude towards the Hospitallers in 1489. On the other hand, the negotiations
of the Mamluk ambassador in France and, later, in Rome to obtain Djem to use against the Ottomans was followed with anxiety as a greater and more immediate danger.

The Mamluks of Egypt were involved from the beginning in the intense international struggle to obtain Djem in order to use him in their fight against the Ottomans. Especially after war broke out between the Ottomans and the Mamluks in 1485, Kayitbay, Sultan of Egypt (1468-1496), did his utmost to bring Djem to Egypt. After Djem’s transfer to Rome in 1489, Djem seemed to prefer to join Kayitbay, a Muslim ruler, rather than Matthias, for his fight against Bayezid. Even if Kayitbay could not use Djem directly in the Egyptian campaign against the Ottomans, Djem’s participation in a Crusade from the West would divert Ottoman forces from the Egyptian front. This cooperation between Christian Europe and the Islamic state of Egypt, once the sole protagonist of Muslim Holy War, against the Ottoman ghâzi state, indicates that during the fifteenth century, in the East as well as in the West, political expediency superseded strict religious idealism.

In his attempts to obtain Djem, the Mamluk Sultan chose the mediation of Lorenzo de’ Medici, apparently because of Lorenzo’s influence in the courts of France and the Papacy, as well as his extensive banking operations. In November 1487, when the Egyptian ambassador arrived in Florence, Lorenzo first wanted to limit the negotiations to the commercial sphere, seeking to avoid offending the Ottomans, with whom Florence had developed an extensive trade during the last twenty years. However, Lorenzo did not hesitate for long to take advantage of opportunities of financial profit and the trade privileges which the Mamluk Sultan had promised him in return for his efforts to obtain Djem. In the spring of 1488, Lorenzo Spinalli, one of Medici’s agents in France, offered the French King one hundred thousand gold ducats in the name of Kayitbay for the delivery of Djem. Since Papal nuncios had already been granted permission to take Djem to Rome by the French government, which believed that this was in the best interest of Christendom, Egyptian and Hungarian requests were declined. The nuncios had argued that Rhodes and Italy were under serious threat of an Ottoman invasion and that only the presence of Djem in Rome could deter Bayezid. The French chancellor agreed that only the Pope could restore peace and unity among the Christian nations and lead a crusade against the Ottomans. Of course, in return the French were expecting political advantages in the form of papal support for their own problems in Flanders against Maximillian and the inheritance of Bretagne.

Before long, on 21 January 1489, Bayezid’s envoy, Greek-born Antonios Ciritho (or Antonio Rerito),13 together with Camillo Pandone, the envoy of the King of Naples, arrived at the French court and made most attractive offers on the condition that the French King not surrender Djem to the enemies of the Ottomans. In order to foil his enemies’ plans, Bayezid had instructed his envoy to say that he was ready to sign a peace agreement with the King of France and to make peace with the entire Christian world, as well as to pay a considerable sum of money. Moreover, Bayezid offered a military alliance promising the King aid against his enemies. Even more surprising was the Ottoman Sultan’s promise to deliver the city of Jerusalem to the French, after its capture from the Mamluks. All of this would be in exchange for the King’s promise to keep Djem guarded in France. Alongside these generous offers, however, Bayezid warned the King that, should he refuse to accept the offer of friendship, Bayezid would make peace with the Sultan of Egypt and combine with his forces against the Christian world. The Sultan’s offers impressed the king’s council, and orders were sent out to stop Djem on his way to Rome. But, in the end, the nuncios succeeded in putting Djem in a boat belonging to the Knights of Rhodes bound for the Papal state (21 February 1489). The Ottoman Prince entered Rome on 13 March.

The Egyptian ambassador, who was still hoping to obtain Djem, was present in Rome at Djem’s reception by the Pope, when Innocent VIII (1484-1492) sent his envoy, Philippo Canovi, to Rhodes to negotiate with Kayitbay on the matter of Djem. By this time the prize for Djem’s delivery was increased to six hundred thousand gold ducats, and d’Aubusson was informed by the Pope to conduct the negotiations with the Egyptian Sultan on this basis. In justification for his constant bartering, the Pope expressed his intention to spend this sum in order to equip a fleet for the crusade against the Ottomans.

Now that Djem was in Rome, the power and influence of the Pope were greatly enhanced, and papal diplomacy became increasingly complex. While Matthias was pressing the Pope to deliver Djem to him as the only power capable of fighting against the Ottomans, the Pope declared his decision to convene a congress to be attended by the delegates of all the Christian states in Europe in order to prepare a
crusade. At the same time, the Egyptian ambassador in Rome declared Kayibay’s willingness to join an anti-Ottoman league, should Djem be delivered to him, and promised to return all the Christian territories conquered by the Ottomans.

The Türkdenkongress, opened in Rome on 15 March 1490, was the logical outcome of papal diplomacy of bringing Djem to Rome. The pope declared that this was the most favorable moment to take action against the Ottomans. The Ottoman prince was most valuable as a standing menace to the Sultan and as a means of breaking up the Ottoman Empire. It was believed that Djem was prepared, in the event that he obtained the Ottoman throne through Christian help, to withdraw from the Balkans, even to give up Istanbul. In the crusading plan prepared during the congress, a general peace of three years in Europe was proposed together with the formation of an army of about 95,000 men. Whether Djem would take part in the campaign in custody or free was to be decided later on. The army was to contain contingents from Italy, Germany, Hungary, and Wallachia. The Christian navy was to attack Morea and Euboea. An attack on the Muslims of the Maghreb was also being considered. The Sultan of Egypt would still be invited to participate in the war against the Ottomans, although the Pope had declared to the Egyptian ambassador that the delivery of Djem to the Hungarian king would better serve the interest of the crusade. However, with the unexpected death of Matthias Corvinus on 6 April 1490, all the plans for the crusade fell through. In addition, the struggle between various European powers, between Charles VIII and Maximillian, as well as between Ferrante and Innocent VIII, started up once again. While the Ottoman War against the Mamluks in Cilicia continued, a crusade attack from the west would have created a most dangerous situation for the Ottoman Empire. Ottoman tactics during the Djem crisis were to neutralize the West by an aggressive diplomacy, sending envoys with lavish promises, presents, money and relics on the one hand; to dishearten Christians by showing strength and building up a strong navy ready to strike; and preparing large-scale raids on the Danube and Bosnian frontier. Friendly relations were sustained with Venice, whose sea power was thought to be of crucial importance for the realization of a crusade against the Ottoman Empire. In the face of the most dangerous situation following Djem’s transfer to Rome in 1489, Bayezid used the same tactics and found Innocent VIII quite amenable to negotiation.

We do not know who made the first move for an exchange of ambassadors, but we do know that the Grand Master of Rhodes, P. d’Aubusson, who was the central figure in the East-West relations during the Djem crises and manipulated things to get maximum profit for the island and his person, now offered his mediation in an agreement between the Sultan and the Pope. Bayezid promptly sent his envoy to Rhodes. From 1482 on, d’Aubusson had pretended to be a collaborator of Bayezid II in his plans to assassinate Djem and had exacted extra money from Bayezid II, while the Grand Master received at the same time the cardinal’s cap from the Pope and money from the Egyptian sultan for the use of Djem in a war or crusade against the Ottomans. In other words, the prolongation of the custody of Djem, rather than to use of him, was the real concern of the Grand Master. In order to appease Bayezid II after Djem was transferred to Rome, d’Aubusson wrote that the Pope’s custody of Djem was eventually less dangerous to Ottoman interests than the French King’s control, because it was difficult for the Pope to unite the Christian nations for a crusade while the French King had sufficient resources for such an undertaking. The prime concern of the Grand Master and the Pope at that time was apparently to neutralize an Ottoman offensive against Rhodes and Italy. Innocent came to think along the same line and, furthermore, being short of money, the Pope wanted to receive a regular and substantial income from his function as custodian of Djem Sultan. The earliest document bearing the testimony to Innocent VIII’s interest in establishing relations with the Sultan belongs to 21 December 1489.

To negotiate with the Sultan, the Pope employed one of his compatriots, Giovanni-Battista Gentile, a Genoese merchant in Istanbul. The Venetian government suspected Gentile’s secret dealings with the Sultan and Djem Sultan’s person; through the Venetian oratore in Rome, Domenico Trevisan, warned the Pope about it, but the Venetians were unaware of the fact that Gentile was actually in the service of the Pope.

In a letter dated 16 May 1490, the Sultan wrote to Innocent VIII that he had learned of the transfer of Djem to Rome through the Grand Master with great satisfaction, and that he was hoping that an agreement with the Pope would soon be reached about his custody.

MUSTAFA’S MISSION AND THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN BAYEZID II AND INNOCENT VIII
Later, a Genoese Dominican, Fra Leonardo of Chiavari, who apparently lived in Pera, was employed as an envoy in the Pope’s relations with the Sultan. Leonardo had made the personal acquaintance of the Sultan, and was referred to in the Sultan’s letter to the Pope dated 28 October 1490. In the late spring or summer of 1490, Leonardo came to Rome in the company of an envoy to negotiate Djem’s custody. Leonardo was back in Istanbul in the fall (before 18 October 1490).

These preliminary secret rapport between the Curia and the Porte apparently served to prepare the ground for Bayezid’s sending an ambassador to Rome to finalize the agreement. In fact, upon the transfer of Djem into the custody of the Pope in Rome, the Porte had lost the guarantee under the pact with the Grand Master of Rhodes that Djem was not going to be delivered to the enemies of Bayezid II. The Pope, in his turn, needed an agreement with the Sultan to receive the yearly payment of forty thousand gold ducats to which he was entitled, in accordance with the concord signed with the French King. Apparently Bayezid II was concerned about concluding the agreement as soon as possible, while Innocent VIII had to make the Christian world believe his intention of initiating a crusade by taking Djem to Rome. The Sultan had chosen for this crucial mission an important man of his court, kapudan-bashi Mustafa, and was ready to send him to the Pope via Rhodes in March. But, because of the Pope’s crusade maneuver in Rome, the ottoman embassy was delayed for four months. (The Türkenkongress held its sessions in Rome between 3 June and 30 July 1490.) Mustafa went to Rhodes in June and conducted talks with the Grand Master while waiting to be taken on a Rhodian ship to Italy. On his way to Ancona, he was accompanied by the Prior of Aubergne, Guy de Blachefort (Biyanke-Kort [Fort] in Wâkıfât, p. 23), the Grand Master’s representative.

In a letter dated 18 November 1490, P. Pandolfini, the Florentine ambassador in Rome, reported the purpose of the ottoman embassy as follows:

Et perché ha huvuto notitia che questo suo fratello è in mano dal Papa, manda decto Imbasciadore per vedere se il fratello è vivo, et notificare al Papa questa convenzione facsta col Maestro di Rodi, stimando gli habbi ad essero grata, et per consequens habbi a tenere il fratello a bunona gardia, ne permettere gli possi far guerra. Questo è quello che ho inteso..."

Venice had the intelligence that Mustafa’s real mission was to assassinate Djem. The Venetian ambassador in Rome, Ernolao Barbaro, was instructed to warn the Pope about the danger before the arrival of the Ottoman ambassador. Mustafa was bringing large sums of money (120,000 gold ducats), which the same report speculated was to be used for the conspiracy against Djem’s life. The Venetian authorities had no trust in John Kendall, the Rhodian knight who was in charge of guardianship of Djem, and feared that he might be tempted by Mustafa. Franz Babinger seemed inclined to dismiss all these rumors of conspiracy against Djem and questioned the real part played by Giovanni Battista Gentile and the Dominican Leonardo in this connection, whereas Thaonse and others, following Venetian intelligence reports, believed them to have participated in a conspiracy against Djem.

It is to be remembered that Bayezid’s purpose was always the elimination of his brother, as disclosed in his secret personal correspondence with the Grand Master d’Aubusson since 1482, who, in order to exact money, feigned cooperation with the Sultan. The extraordinary measures taken against an attempt at poisoning Djem during Mustafa’s visit indicate that the Pope took the Venetian warning seriously. What is more, there were rumors that the conspirators had an accomplice in the Papal court itself. In 1491, Venetians confirmed that the Sultan was trying to bribe certain members of the court to assassinate Djem by poison or another means. In a letter dated 16 February 1490 to Lorenzo de’ Medici, the conspirator inside the Papal court was believed to be Niccolò Cibo, archbishop of Arles. Niccolò was to serve as an interpreter during Mustafa’s talks with Innocent VIII in 1490, and made friends with him, as he later called him “his beloved friend Mustafa Beg” in his report to Bayezid II in 1494. In the same year the Sultan recommended to Pope Alexander VI that he make Cibo a cardinal. All these seem to confirm the suspicions about Cibo.

Mustafa’s activities while in Rome are described in detail by the contemporary Italian sources and are fully exploited by modern historians. Mustafa’s visit to Rome made it possible for Bayezid to obtain direct contact with the Pope and to disclose the secret practices and pretensions of the Grand Master. Besides, d’Aubusson’s pretension to be secretly cooperating with the Sultan to assassinate Djem was to compromise the Pope’s position and dignity. The large sum Mustafa brought to Rome was said to be for the same purpose. At any rate, one week after the formal audience on 1 December 1490, when
Mustafa delivered the Sultan’s letter and made clear the purpose of his embassy, the Pope had a special interview with Mustafa in the presence of Francesco Cibo and the cardinals and wanted to learn all about the agreements between the Sultan and the Grand Master and the amount of money received.47 Mustafa’s disclosures proved that d’Aubusson was concealing his special agreements with the Sultan which were all secret and verbal and that he received much more money than was stipulated in the written agreement. Also, in another meeting with Mustafa, only in the presence of the cardinals, Mustafa’s clarifications demonstrated that the Grand Master’s claim that Bayezid II wanted only the Hospitalers to be the guardians of Djem was not true.48 It became evident that in all of his dealings d’Aubusson had regarded Djem as his own prisoner rather than the prisoner of the Order or of any other authority.49 As to the key issue to be decided between the Sultan and the Pope, it was made clear in the letter from Bayezid II and in Mustafa’s statement during the first audience before the ambassadors of European nations. In his letter to the Pope,50 Bayezid II said that he was pleased to learn that Djem was conveyed to Rome and hoped that Djem was maintained at the Vatican under the same terms as the Grand Master had undertaken his custody some years ago “according to a convention of peace entered into between them, which has been kept by both sides up to now, and has been the cause of friendship.” To secure papal approval of the conditions of Djem’s pension “we have sent,” the Sultan said, “our faithful slave the Kapudji-bashir”21 Mustafa, with one of the officials of the cardinal [Grand] Master in order that we may be assured by him that you also have confirmed this agreement, so that our friendship may increase: whatever therefore our envoy, the most faithful slave Mustafa, shall say in the presence of your Magnificence, receive as though they were our own words.”

Thus, Bayezid’s avowed concern was to guarantee that Djem was now kept under custody of the Pope under the same conditions as had been agreed upon with the Hospitalers. In return, the Sultan was ready to pay “the pension” and keep peace. The Sultan’s ambassador declared that if the conditions were accepted, which meant the relinquishment of the idea of using Djem in a crusade against the Ottoman Empire, the Sultan would keep peace with all the Christian nations.52

It should be noted that throughout Mustafa’s stay in Rome, the Pope took pains to show that the Christian ambassadors who had come to discuss the plan of a crusade against the Ottomans would take part in the decision to be made. In the final audience on 3 January 1491, the Pope found it necessary first to explain to the Christian ambassadors that Mustafa asserted, contrary to his first declaration, that the Sultan promised the peace only to Rhodes and the Papal state (and Venice at sea) excluding other Christian nations.53 When Mustafa was received afterwards, he repeated it in the presence of the ambassadors, and the Rhodian representative contradicted him, saying that Mustafa had spoken of peace to all Christian princes while he was in Rhodes. When the Sultan’s ambassador left the hall of audience, the Pope, addressing again the Christian ambassadors, told them that now that they had witnessed all that had happened, they would report it to their respective governments and seek their advice so that the Pope could give his answer to the Sultan’s proposals.54

In his letter dated 3 January 1491,55 the Pope wrote to Bayezid II that because of the importance of the proposals he let all the Christian states know about them and asked them to send their advice. Since this will take some time, he said, he sends Mustafa back to Istanbul, adding that Mustafa saw Djem safe and sound.

Mustafa immediately set out for Istanbul. Now the question arises whether or not there was any agreement between the Pope and the Sultan’s ambassador at this point. In the information he gave to the historian İdris, Mustafa himself claimed to have made an agreement with the Pope, which was vowed by an oath, as required in the Christian religion, to the effect that the Pope shall keep Djem in custody and not let him attack Bayezid’s lands and that in return the Sultan would not harm the Pope’s country.56

In his biographical note on Mustafa, İdris emphasized that he had returned from his mission “with a sworn agreement (‘ahd u misâk) with the European rulers.”

On the occasion of Mustafa’s visit to Rome, the author of Wâkıâyât (p. 24), an intimate of Djem, says that in the meantime several exchanges of letters also took place between the Pope and the Sultan regarding the delivery of Djem to the Sultan. L. Thuasne, L. Pastor and K. Setton, who carefully examined the Western sources on the Djem affair, did not detect any secret dealings of the Pope with Sultan’s ambassador. F. Babinger,57 however, noted that the Pope has been carrying on some secret relations with the Sultan since December 1489. In fact, the Pope’s behavior looked somewhat suspicious. While he took pains to show the Christian ambassadors that all his
dealing with Sultan’s envoy were taking place openly before their eyes and that no agreement was made beyond their knowledge, the Pope immediately sent an envoy to Istanbul and requested payment of forty thousand ducats.

There were some nasty rumors in France against the Pope’s dealings with the Sultan about Djem. To prevent it, the Pope’s nuncios produced his letter to Bayezid II, which said that the Pope would not make any decision about Djem without first taking the advice of the Christian princes.58 Nevertheless, Charles VIII, the French King, was said at this point to be interested in taking back Djem from the Pope, as nuncios in France suspected from Guy de Blanchefort’s secret talks with the king in the spring of 1491. Guy was d’Aubusson’s nephew and his representative for his affairs in Europe at this time. The Grand Master evidently did not feel happy that Djem’s pension59 and other benefits were diverted from him. (In the summer of 1494, Mustafa Beg reported that the French King wanted to take back Djem “to deliver him to the person from whom he was taken [d’Aubusson].”60 But it was only when the question of the succession of Naples came up (February 1494) that the French King would declare formally to the Pope his determination of having Djem back and to attack the Ottoman Empire in a crusade. During Charles VIII’s expedition in Italy in the fall of 1494, d’Aubusson was believed to be ready to cooperate with the French.61

The Sultan’s agreements with Christian rulers were usually made verbally, and Mustafa, his pleni-potentiary ambassador to the Pope, was empowered to make vows and agreements on his behalf, as specified in the Sultan’s letter to the Pope.

During his stay in Rome, Mustafa, as instructed by his master, wanted to meet Djem personally in order to see if he was alive before any payment was made. Despite the concern expressed by the Rhodians, the Pope gave his permission.62 As we learn from the instructions given to his envoy dated 18 January 1491,63 the Pope even requested some extra favors from the Sultan—bestowal of some relics preserved in the Sultan’s treasury, amenities for certain of the Pope’s relatives in Galata and for a Florentine family dispossessed by Mehmed II.

Just as the Pope employed his nephew Niccolò Cibo during the negotiations with the Sultan’s ambassador, so the Pope’s envoy to the Sultan, sent to request payment of forty thousand ducats, was another member of the Cibo family, Giorgia Bocciardi (Bucciardus or Buzardus), brother of Niccolò.64 In the secret instructions given to him dated 18 January 1491, a fortnight after Mustafa’s audience, the Pope gave details of how “the pension” or “tribute” should be paid—in Venetian gold ducats every year on December 1.65 The Pope’s dispatch of a nuncio to collect Djem’s pension can be considered as a positive indication that an agreement, verbal and secret, was reached between the Pope and Mustafa.66 The Sultan’s request as expressed in his letter and through his ambassador was definite: confirmation of the convention with the Grand Master, which provided that custody of Djem was a precondition of peace and payment of forty thousand gold pieces.67 It is assumed that Mustafa delivered 120,000 ducats to Innocent VIII, which corresponded to three years’ pension of Djem, after seeing him.68

As a result of the agreement made by Mustafa in Rome in January 1491, the Ottoman Porte believed that a crusade was not likely in the near future, and this belief must have encouraged them to resume their aggressive policy against Hungary. The internal conflicts and Maximilian’s invasion of Hungary following Matthias Corvinus’ death in 1490 had created extremely favorable conditions for the Ottomans to consolidate their position on the Danube. Inactive for a long time, the frontier forces were impatient to resume their raids into Hungary, which they believed now was incapable of putting up serious resistance. The Hungarian ambassador to the Sultan, Emerich Czobor, was unsuccessful in his attempt at the renewal of the truce ending in 149169 and Ujlaki, ban of Macció (Machwa), an opponent of the King Wladislaw, was giving hope to the Ottomans for a possible surrender of Belgrade. The first large-scale Ottoman raid made under the frontier Beg Mihal-oglu ‘Ali through Severin and Pojejian into Varad and Temesvar was not very successful.70 In the same year Bayezid II concluded a peace agreement with Egypt,71 and made large-scale preparations for a campaign on land and sea for the following year. Again Idris gives us first-hand details on the planning and real objectives of this campaign.72 The secret preparations, the construction of a large fleet, “eighty sailing including thirty galleys”73 in particular, gave rise to speculations about the real target of the Ottomans in Italy. Venice and Naples took defensive measures, and both demanded that, for their common safety, the Pope use the instrumentum in his hands, that is Djem Sultan.74 The Italian states did not have to be alarmed since the Sultan did not have an intention or plan to attack Italy.75 The Venetians were assured of it by June.76 According to Idris’ observations, Suleyman Paşa, Ottoman frontier
lord at Smederevo, had invited the Hungarian ban (Ujlaki) to recognize Ottoman suzerainty and surrender Belgrade by promising to add to his possessions the Ottoman fortresses of Aladžahisar (Kruševac) and Zvornik. Bayezid II, who himself did not give too much credit to the reportedly favorable disposition of the ban, suggested, in case the ban changed his mind about surrendering Belgrade, the army should change its destination toward the Adriatic Sea to crush Albanian rebels and submit Montenegro. When in Sofia at the head of his army the Sultan received the news that the Hungarian ban changed his mind and that Hungarians were united to resist the Sultan, he set out with the bulk of his army to invade northern Albania. A dervish attempted to kill the Sultan, while he was returning from this campaign, near Monastir. On the Hungarian front, raids under the frontier beggs, Mihal-oghlu ʿAli and Suleyman Paşa, as well as the blockade of Belgrade were foiled in the face of stiff Hungarian resistance.

Before he had left Istanbul for this campaign on 6 April 1492, the Sultan showed his intention to keep peace with the Pope by sending an envoy to Innocent VIII with 40,000 gold ducats along with valuable relics including the iron head of the lance which pierced Christ’s side at the crucifixion, which the Pope had specifically requested through his ambassador Bociardi.

According to a report dated 2 May 1492, by Filippo Valori, Florentine envoy to Rome, the Ottoman ambassador “viene per praticare qualche modo di composizione per assedurar e princìpi cristiani, et appresso per far dogliazza al Papa del Gran Maestro di Rodi che da ricepto a tutti e corsoli che danneggiano ne mari di jurisdizion del Turco; facendo intendere che volendo conservare buona pace.” The complaint about the Christian corsairs which was justified by certain recent events was actually designed to alleviate the worry and suspicion arising from the Ottoman naval preparations. The fleet was intended, the Ottoman Government maintained, against the corsairs. The delivery of the 40,000 ducats with the most generous gifts was indeed a positive indication of Bayezid II’s appeasement policy with the Pope and of the existence of a tacit agreement between the two parties about the custody of Djem and keeping peace.


As to the modern Turkish historians, ISMAIL HİKMET ERTAYLAN, Sultan Cem, Istanbul 1951, and DR. SELAHATTIN TANSEL, Sultan II Bayezit’ in Siyasi Hayat, Istanbul 1966, 1-69, both made use of contemporary Ottoman sources, including an important collection of documents preserved in the Topkapı Sarayi Archives (hereafter TSA). Ertaylan and Tansel drew on Wâkı‘âr and Idris, the most important contemporary sources on Djem. But a critical study of the sources they made use of is still needed. The contemporary historian KEMAL PAŞAŽADE, Tawařîkh-i Âl-i ʿOsmânlı, Defter VIII, is surprisingly brief on Djem’s life in Europe. We have not been able to examine Wâkı‘âr-nâme-i Bihisht or Târîkh-i Sultan Djem (TKS Library, R. 1270), anonymous Wâkı‘âr-i Sultan Bâyezid ve Selim Khan (TKS Library, E.H. 1416), a treatise on Bayezid II and Djem (TKS Library Medjmû’a, E.H. 1774) and a Târîkh-i Sultan Bâyezid (TKS Library, R. 1272).

2. MEHMET ARIF, editor of Wâkı‘âr, supplement to Târîkh-i ʿOsmâni Endjîmeni Medjmû’as, Istanbul 1330/1914, thinks that the author is Haydar Beg, a secretary and literary man. SEHI, Heth Bihisht, ed. Güney Kut, Harvard, 1978, 246-47, tells that Haydar, an able poet, spent his life with Djem in Europe. In Latifi, Tedhikre, Istanbul 1314 H., 140, “Haydar Çelebi” was Djem’s defterdar, and brought Djem’s belongings after his death to Turkey (in Wâkı‘âr, 33: “Khatib-žade ve sâir khalkî”). Bayezid II granted him a zemedet at Germiyân, but he believed he was disesteemed. It appears that Latifi had a source on Haydar but makes no mention of Wâkı‘âr. Şahîhî was another defterdar of Djem Sultan (Latifi, p. 200). A “Haydar Çelebi” reë­is al-
the Levant in the sixteenth century. It is to be noted, however, that his version of the poisoning is different from Idris’ account (according to Idris the poisoning resulted from shaving with a razor). There is no doubt that Ghurbetname was compiled under Süleyman I (see p. 227-28). The author mentions the prophecy about the entry in Rome of an Ottoman Sultan who, in his belief, was to be Sultan Süleyman Khan, not Djem as interpreted in Europe. F. Babinger, Geschichtsschreiber der Osmanen und ihre Werke, Leipzig 1927, 32, mentions a biography of Djem in rhyme, called Ghurbetname by Sa’dullâh b. Mustâfâ, also known as Djem Sa’disi. No copy of it has been found; on Sa’di, see Sehi, ed. Gûnay Kut, 198-200; Latifi, 188-89; “Aşık Çelebi, ed. G. M. Meredith-Owens, 67b, says that Djem sent his favorite Sa’di to Bayezid II with his poems including his “madjeray ve dâstân.”

4. For Idris (died 12 November 1520) and his work, see Babinger, ibid., 45-49; F. R. Unat, “Neşri Tarihî Üzerinde Yapılan Çalışmalar,” Belleten VII (Ankara, 1943), pp. 147-200. An autograph copy of the earlier version of Hasht Bihisht which we made use of is written in 1509, preserved at the Topkapi Palace Library, H. 1655.

5. Idris’ testimony provides definite evidence that Kapudji-bashi Mustafa and Grand Vizir Kodja Mustafa Paşa were the same person. Idris gives a relatively detailed account of Mustafa’s life in his history along with great praise. Mustafa, Idris says, started his career as a seraglio page (ghulâm). Trusted with the responsibility of handling important affairs, he was promoted to higher offices in the seraglio. Then, the Sultan sent him as an envoy to Djem “to bring news of great kings and rulers of the infidel. From this journey full of dangers and fighting against all kinds of enemies, he returned with an agreement made under the oath with the Italian rulers (‘âhd wa mişk-i salâtin-i Frenk) as the Sultan wished.” Upon this success he was made Beylerbeyi of Rumeli in Dhu’l-ka‘da 903/June-July 1498, and later, in Djamâda II 907/12 December 1501-9 January 1502, a vizir in the imperial council, and finally a grand vizir. Idris places emphasis on his unusual interest in mysticism and his companionship with mystics.

I. H. Uzuncarşılı (Osmanlı Tarıhi, II, 2nd edition, Ankara 1964, p. 541, and Belleten XXIV, p. 469 note 11) using a wakf record gives the date of his beylerbeyilik as 904 H and that of his vizirat as 906 H. On the basis of the same document Uzuncarşılı notes that Mustafa b. ‘Abd al-Şamad was made khazinedâr-bashi in 886/1481, sandjak-begi of Avlonya (Valona, Vlorë) in 901/1495-1496 (in Osmanlı Tarıhi, but in Belleten: 900 A. H.), sandjak-begi of Gelibolu (admiral of the Otto-
man navy) in 903/1497-1498, Beylerbeyi of Rumel in 904/1499; for a
discussion of this chronology, see our explanations in the article.
Mustafa was made grand vizir on Shawwal 16, 917/January 6, 1512,
as a document from TKS claims (see Ç. Uluçay, “Yaşar Sultan Selim
Nasil Padişah Oldu,” Tarih Dergisi, VII-10, İstanbul, September
1954, 122). However, if T. Gökbilgin’s reading is correct (Edirne ve
Paşa Livâtı, İstanbul 1952, p. 107), Mustafa was already grand vizir
on 17 September 1511. Documents exist on Mustafa as second vizir
on Şahrıban 912 (Gökbilgin, 379), on Ramadan 22, 914 (Gökbilgin,
92, 103, and 167) and on Rabî‘ I, 915 (ibid, 235); as grand vizir on
Radjab 4, 917 (Gökbilgin, 107) and Djamâda I, 21, 918 (?) (in
Gökbilgin: 911). On 23 January 1504 Mustafa received a present of
sixty thousand ənda from Bayezid II (Gökbilgin, 476). For the
charitable works and endowments of Mustafa Paşa, see Gökbilgin,
pp. 441-48; Ö. L. Barkan and E. H. Ayverdi, İstanbul Vakıflar Tahrir
Defteri, Istanbul 1970, 366-69; an anonymous chronicle, particularly
important for the chronology of this period (Bibliothèque Nationale,
Paris, Sup, 104, folio 144-45), tells us that on 17 October 1501,
Rumelı Beylerbeyi Mustafa Paşa left Istanbul and came to the area
of Filibe on the rumors of a Hungarian threat, and on his return to
Istanbul he was elevated to the office of vizir on 13 Radjab 907/
22 January 1502.
6. See my “Osmanlılar’da Sultanat Verâseti Usûlû ve Türk
XIV, 69-94, translation to English in this volume.
7. While Djem was in Europe “there was always unrest (fetret)
among the corps at the Porte when, by God’s order, Djem Sultan
died. Only then people had some peace and comfort.” (Sehı, ed.
Günay Kut, 323); cf. Théodore Spandony Cantacasins, Petit Traicté
8. The History of Mehmed the Conqueror by Tursun Beg, ed. H.
9. Djem’s mother, Çiçek Khâtun, in Egypt was urging the Sultan
through his wife to free and bring her son to Egypt; see intelligence
from Egypt to Bayezid II, TKS no. 6008/3, signed by Ya’küb; for
Çiçek Khâtun in Egypt, see Ibn Iyâs, Badâtî al-Zahûr fi Wâkûtî al-
Duhûr, III ed. M. Mostafa, Cairo 1963, 390; an intelligence report,
TKS 6961/3 dated 16 Djamâda II 892/9 June 1487 and signed by
Mustafa, informed the Sultan that Djem sent word and wanted Venice
and the King of Hungary to deliver him from his captivity in France
and that, thereupon, Venice and the king in agreement sent their
envoys to France. In actual fact, the king had appointed an ambassador
to France in January 1487, and Venice was secretly supporting
the Pope’s effort to get Djem from the king of France. In the meantime
in March 1487 a Turkish envoy arrived in Venice; see L. Thuasne, Djem
Sultan, Paris 1892, 149-56.
10. To the Pope’s demand about joining the king of Hungary Djem
replied: “If I go to Hungary I have to be with the Hungarian army in
battle against Muslims. This would cause the Ottoman ulama to
declare that I had become an infidel. I cannot abandon my faith, even
for the rule of the whole world” (Wâkêât, 23).
11. In 1483 Bayezid II made promises to purchase yearly 5000
bares of costly woolen cloth from Florence, see Wilhelm Heyd,
1936, 342. The exchange of woolen cloth with Iranian silk at the Bursa
market was of vital interest to Florence. See H. İnalçık, “Bursa and
the Commerce of the Levant,” Journal of Economic and Social History
of the Orient, III-2, 131-147; for Ottoman-Florentine relations in
the period, see G. Müller, Documenti sulle relazioni delle città toscane
coll’Orineto cristiano e coi Turchi, Florence 1879; F. Babinger,
“Lorenzo de Medici e la corte ottomana,” Archivio Storico Italiano
121 (1963), 305-361.
12. For these privileges see John Vansborough, “A Mamluk
Commercial Treaty Concluded with the Republic of Florence,”
Documents from Islamic Chanceries, ed. S. M. Stern, Cambridge 1965,39-
79.
13. Thuasne, 193; Babinger, 353, 54.
14. Thuasne, 176-86.
15. E. Charrière, Négociations de la France dans le Levant, I, Paris
1848, CXXIV; F. Babinger, Reliquienschacher am Osmanenhof im
XV. Jahrhundert, Munich 1956, 17-18.
17. Thuasne, 254.
19. F. Cognasso, “Il Sultano Djem alla Corte di Alessandro VI,”
Popoli (1942), 96-103.
20. Pastor, II, 231-33; for Spanish reconquista and Islam in general,
see Andrew C. Hess, The Forgotten Frontier. A History of the
Sixteenth-century Ibero-African Frontier. Chicago 1978, 1-44; the
history of relations between Muslims in the eastern and western
Mediterranean in the face of Spanish expansion during the period 1490-1510 is still to be written. The peace between the Ottomans and the Mamluks was concluded upon the appeal of the Sultan of Tunis, as the contemporary historian Idris, Hashi Bihišiš, tells us (Ṣaʿd al-Dīn, Tādz al-Tawārīk, II, Istanbul 1863, 66-68 follow Idris). The earliest record about Kemal Reis’ naval raids against Spain is dated 1487; see H. A. von Burski, Kemal Reis, Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der türkischen Flotte, Bonn 1928, 21-22; the Ottoman-Mamluk peace treaty was ratified in Cairo in Djumāda II, 896/April 1491; see Ibn Ilyās, ibid., 280-82; also H. Edhem, “Hersek Oğlu Ahmed Pasa’nın Esaretine Dair Kahire’den bir Kitābē,” TOEM, V, 272-74; an ambassador of “the Sultan of Meghreb” was killed on his way to the Bayezid’s court in 1481, TKS no. 11981, in Ertaylan, 188.

23. For the Pope’s financial difficulties, see Pastor, III, 270-72, 281-85; Thussian, 189; H. Pfeffermann, Die Zusammenarbeit der Renaissancepäpste mit den Türk en, Winterthur 1946, 89; according to the agreement with Charles VIII, the Pope was to receive the money paid by the Sultan for Djem's maintenance. According to Sigismondo de' Conti, it cost the papacy 15,000 ducats a year to maintain him; see Setton, II, 410. In 1489, Innocent was quite ready to deliver Djem to the Egyptian Sultan Kaitbay for 200,000 ducats: see Setton, II, 407, note 91. The original agreement between Bayezid II and P. d`Aubusson stipulated that on August 1st each year the Sultan was to pay 45,000 gold ducats; see Thussian, p. 86. According to Bosio (Thussian, p.86, note 2) 35,000 of it was for the maintenance of Djem and 10,000 for the Grand Master.
25. Ibid., 68-69.
27. Ibid., 71.
28. The Florentine oratore in Rome, Pier-Filippo Pandolfini, heard about these negotiations and reported to Lorenzo de’ Medici in a letter dated 19 July 1490, see Babinger, ibid., 70-71.

29. Setton, 406.
30. “Domini Turcorum discissit unus orator nomine Mustafa Bey, vir magnae authoritatis et gratiae apud ipsum Turcurn” (Babinger, ibid., 72).
31. Thussian, pp. 264-65. The Venetian dispatch giving these details is published by Babinger, ibid., 71-72.
32. But Mustafa was in the Anconitan territory already on 13 October 1490, see Thussian, 276; Babinger, ibid., 72.
33. Thussian, 276, note 5.
35. Ibid., 272-75.
36. Spätmittelalterliche fränkische Briefschaften, 54-75.
37. Thussian, 268-70; Setton, II, 425.
38. Bayezid’s letters concerning the conspiracy against Djem’s life shall make the subject of another article; some of the letters are published by Ertaylan, 160-61, 206-78; and I. H. Uzuncarşılı, “Cem Sultan’a Dair Origjinal Vesika, “Belleten, XIV, 476; Western sources were informed of this constant threat against Djem’s life by his brother; see Thussian, 262-64, 269-73, 279; Lamansky, ibid., 201-62; I think Barak and Ismā‘īl were two agents sent by Bayezid II to conspire against Djem; for Barak’s itinerary, see V. L. Ménage, “The Mission of an Ottoman Secret Agent in France in 1486,” Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1965, 112-32; Babinger, ibid., 30.
39. The Knights of Rhodes who accompanied the Sultan’s ambas- sador to Rome in 1489 were suspicious about Mustafa’s intentions: see Thussian, 279.
40. Thussian, 263.
42. Thussian, 263, the letter in Appendix no. 14, 428-29.
44. Niccolò Cibo was a relative of Innocent VIII; for the genealogy, see F. Babinger, ibid., 64, note 30; and Setton, II index: Cibo.
45. The most important sources for Djem in Rome are Stefano Infessura, Diario della città di Roma, ed. O. Tommasini, Roma, 1890; Sigismondo de’ Conti, Le Storice de sui tempi dal 1475 al 1510, I,
Rome 1883, Marino Sanuto, La Spedizione di Carlo VIII in Italia, ed. R. Fulin, Venice, 1883, and, in particular, Johann Buarchard (or Burkard), master of ceremonies at the Papal court; for his life and work see Setton, II, p. 388, note 24. These sources and state papers from Italian archives in the Vatican, Venice, Florence and Mantua are studied by V. Lamansky, Secrets d’Etat de Venise, St. Petersburg, 1884; P. Ferrato, Il Marchesia di Mantova e l’impero Ottomano alla fine del secolo XV, Mantua, 1876; L. Thuasne, Djen Sultan, Paris, 1892, and more recently by F. Babinger, H. J. Kissling and K. Setton. 46. That was a Venetian conjecture: see Thuasne, 273.

47. As for the 20,000 gold pieces the grand master extorted from the Egyptian Sultan or rather from Djem’s mother in Egypt by pretending to bring Djen to Egypt, a settlement was reached to the effect that the Grand Master was to reimburse to Djen only 5000 gold ducats instead (see Wākīrāt, 15, 23; Thuasne, 281). Wākīrāt, 15, also added that the Grand Master was writing false letters using blank papers with Djen’s seal. D’Aubusson had procured them by bribing Djen’s chancellor while he was in Rhodes. An intelligence report about the efforts of Djen’s mother to bring him to Egypt is preserved in TKS, no. 6008/3. For Djen’s correspondence with his mother, see Ertaylan, pp. 226-27 (three letters); for the intimate relations of the Egyptian ambassador in Rome and Djen, see Thuasne, 273. The name of the Egyptian ambassador in 1494, Deli Nasūh, evidently an Ottoman, is known through a report of Mustafa Beg; see Uzuncarşılı, Belleten, XXIV, 482.

48. Thuasne, 277-83.
49. Ibid., 281, note 3.

50. The letter was written in Greek; for a Latin version of it see Setton, p. 418, note 7; an Italian version is to be found in Donado da Lezze, Historia Turchesca, ed. I. Ursu, Bucharest, 1909, 187-88. The date on the Latin and Italian versions varies as 17, 20 and 28 May, 1490. Mustafa had arrived in Rhodes in June. We could not identify the Turkish draft of this letter among the TKS papers. Here we follow the summary of the letter made by Setton, 418.


52. Mustafa said: “... Oltre di questo ti promette et giura il detto Gran Signore che per il tempo che’l detto suo fratello sarà custodito da cristiana, de i quali tu sei Capo et Principe, né in persona, né in beni, nè in terre, nè in altre cose a Te et cristiana pertinenti, quanto lui porta niun danno farà, nè permetterà che sia fatto.” (Donado da Lezze, ed. Ursu, 188-89.)

53. Upon the death of Matthias Corvinus on 6 April 1490 the Ottoman frontier begs were in agitation and pressing the Sultan to make a full-fledged campaign against Hungary. Such a campaign was to be made with the Sultan’s participation in the spring of 1492; see Donado da Lezze, 190-92; J. W. Zinkeisen, Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches in Europa, II, Gotha 1854, 502-503; N. Iorga, GOR, II, Gotha, 1909, 283-84; H. J. Kissling, Sultan Bayezid II. Beziehungen zu Markgraf Francesco II. von Gonzaga, München 1965, 12; S. N. Fisher, The Foreign Relations of Turkey, 1481-1512, Urbana 1948, 46.

54. See Thuasne, 176-84; Setton, II, 418-22.
55. Setton, 421.

56. For many years the Ancona area within the papal state was a target of Ottoman raids; see N. Iorga (Jorga), Notes et Extraits pour servir à l’histoire des croisades au XVe siècle, 1476-1500, Bucharest 1915, 157-59, 163-64; F. Babinger, Ibid., 1 note 3; Jean Delumeau, “Un ponte fra Oriente e Occidente: Ancona nel Cinquecento,” Quaderni Storici, 13 (Ancona 1970), 26-48; Setton, II, 397. There were settlers in the city and the countryside from the Ottoman lands, and Ottoman trade was to develop there so rapidly that it caused concern in Venice. In 1514 Ancona had to grant privileges to Ottoman merchants including Muslims; see T. Stioanovich, “The Conquering Balkan Orthodox Merchant,” The Journal of Economic History, XX (July 1960), 237; Peter Earle, “Commercial Development of Ancona, 1479-1551,” Economic History Review, XXII (1969), 28-44.

57. Spätmittelalterliche fränkische Briefschaften, 54-75.
58. Thuasne, 286-88.
59. For Djen’s pension see note 65.
60. Mustafa’s report in the Topkapi Sarayi Müzesi Archives is reproduced in S. Tansel, Ibid., 64, no.9; we shall analyze this important document in another paper. When Innocent VIII died (the night of 25-26 July 1492), d’Aubusson urged the new Pope to resume an energetic anti-Ottoman policy; see Setton, II, 453-56.
63. Setton, II, 421, note 13; the summary of the letter is in Thusaes, 283.
64. See Setton, II, 421, note 12.
65. See the text of this important document in Setton, II, 419, note 10; 421, note 13. According to the original agreement made on 7 December 1482, with the Grand Master, Bayazid II vowed to pay a sum of 45,000 gold ducats every year on the first of August for the maintenance of Djem Sultan. In his work Giacomo Bosio (1594), chronicler of the Hospitallers, added that 35,000 of it was for Djem's maintenance and the remaining part for d'Abusson (see Thusaes, 86; cf. Setton, 384.) Innocent VIII himself once called this payment by the Sultan a kind of tribute; see Thusaes, 239. Djem's personal expenses ("ses dépenses privées") were 300 ducats a month. According to Setton, 435, note 66: "It would seem quite unnecessary to observe that the 40,000 ducats a year paid by the Porte for Djem's maintenance was tribute and hardly a true pension." According to Sigismondo de' Conti, Djem's yearly expenses amounted to 15,000 ducats; see Pastor, III, 228. Preffermann, 88-90, and Setton, 425, think that Innocent VIII was concerned in getting Djem's pension as a source of income. At his death bed he asked the cardinals' consent to his distribution of 48,000 ducats among members of his family (see Setton, II, 437).

68. Preffermann, 88-89, based on St. Baluzii, Miscellanea, Lucae, 1761, 518; cf. Thusaes, 179. If the 120,000 ducats were actually delivered, 80,000 ducats of it must have been considered as a gift or a bribe since the Pope demanded Djem's pension in 1491.
69. See I. A. Fessler, Geschichte von Ungarn, III, ed. E. Klein, Leipzig, 1874, 149; however, the Turkish Anonymous Bibl. Nationale, MS supp. turc 1047, 100r reads: "In Ramadan 895/July 1491 the ambassador of the new Hungarian King came, and a peace was concluded with Hungary."

70. For details, see Katona cited by Zinkeisen, II, 502; and in particular, Anonymous Ottoman Chronicle no. 1047, folio 100; S. Tansel, ibid., 152-53, relying on Kemal Paşaçade and sources of later dates, is not clear.
71. The negotiations started in Adrianople in the last days of 1490. The peace was concluded in Dümâdâ II 896/April 1491: see Ibn Ilyâs, Badâ'i 'al-Zühurji wakâ'i al-Duhur, III, ed. M. Mostafa, Cairo, 1963, 280-81; it was ratified in Istanbul on 11 October 1491. The Sultan of Tunis, alarmed by the Spanish reconquista, played an important part in bringing about the peace between the two major Muslim states; see above note 20.
72. Here, too, Idris, the source of Sa'd ad-dîn (II, 69-72), should be followed; cf. Hammer-Purgstall, GOR, II, 303; S. Tansel, 153-54; H. J. Kissling, 10-13.
73. According to a Venetian intelligence of 7 May 1492; see Setton, II, 415. In Idris: 20 coques, 5 barcas, eighty galleys and about 200 smaller ships or transports.
75. However, in June 1491, news reached Rome that the Turks with 16 galleys and 14 fuste came and made a landing in Sicily; see Setton, II, 425, note 23.
77. For the situation in Albania, see Jorga, GOR, II, 276-89; for Montenegro, see F. von Miklosich, Die serbischen Dynasten Crnojevici, in Sitzungsberichte der philos.- hist. Klasse der Kais. Akademie der Wissenschaften, XVII (Wien 1886); F. Babinger, Das Ende der Arianiten, in Bayer. Akademie der Wissenschaften, philos.-hist. Klasse, Sitzungsbl. 1960, Heft 4, München 1960, 13, note 1; Kanun i Kanun-name, eds. B. Durdev et al., Sarajevo 1957, 153-77; a report to the Sultan, TKS 5904, in Ertayl, 232, informed him that Leka Dukagin in northern Albania was in rebellion, and was inviting European powers to invade the country. The report must have been written in the summer or fall of 1493; cf. Thusaes, 318. According to the Anonymous chronicle (Paris, no. 1047, 101) "they sent by sea a fleet to obstruct the ways of escape to the infidel. The King of Naples lost to the Ottomans the fortresses of Himara (Chimera) and Sopoto (Sopoto) on the Albanian coast; see Jorga, GOR, II, 284.
78. Although F. Babinger, Reliquienschacher am Osmanenhof im XV. Jahrhundert, München 1956, 26, asserts that this envoy was again kapudî-bashi Mustafa, but no reference is given for it; cf. Thusaes, 296-97; Setton, 425; Kissling, 18. Once, the iron head of the Holy Lance was offered 70,000 ducats by the Venetians (Setton, II, 427).
79. The text in Thusaes 279, note 1.
ADDEDA

1. Kapudji-bash Mustafa delivered a letter of Bayezid II to Djem Sultan at the famous meeting in the Vatican (see Thuasne, 279-80). Djem’s reply to this letter is known through Ottoman munshâ‘ât collections (see Adnan Erzi, “Türkiye Kütüphanelerinden Notlar ve Vesikalar, II,” Belleten, XIV, 1950, 645; Fehiün Beg, Munshâ‘ât al-saltânîn, I, 292-293). A better copy of Djem’s letter is included in the munshâ‘ât of Sâ‘î ʿAbdullâh (see Erzi, ibid.) with the following heading: “This is the copy of the letter of Sultan Djem to Sultan Bayezid which Mustafa Paşa brought when he had been to Europe.” In his letter Djem begs mercy and pleads with his brother not to leave him a prisoner in the hands of “the infidels.” He says he is ready to surrender and takes oath to ever remain obedient to him. During his stay in Rome Djem appeared to have changed in his thoughts and attitude, as hinted in his biography (Wâkı’ât, 23-24; cf. Idris, ibid.). His only desire was to be allowed to go home, whatever the consequences. By now he seems to have realized that there were no chances of success for him against his brother as long as he was a tool in the hands of the Christians to be used in a crusade against his co-religionists. The letter in the Munshâ‘ât echoes his feelings of prostration. The second letter (in Ferîdûn, 291-92, Sâ‘î ʿAbdullâh, 124b-125a), again allegedly brought by Mustafa Paşa from Frêngistân (Europe), must belong to another occasion (cf. Ertaylan, 116-20).

2. While this article was in press a study an Bihishti’s chronicle by Brigitte Moser appeared (Die Chronik des Ahmet Sînâh Çelebi gennant Bihiştî, eine Quelle zur Geschichte des Osmanischen Reiches unter Sultan Bâyezid II, München: Dr. Rudolf Trofenik, 1980). Moser concludes (pp. 32-36) that Bihishti took Idris’ work as a model and closely followed it. But using other sources and his own observations Bihishti made additions here and there. As far as Djem and the diplomatic mission of Mustafa to Rome was concerned a comparison shows that Bihishti drew his information either from Idris or directly from Mustafa Paşa himself. Mustafa Paşa was grand vizier at the time Bihishti was writing his chronicle (Text: 217a, cf.p.21). Bihishti too says that the Pope made an agreement with Sultan Bayezid II under oath. However, on Djem’s death, Bihishti makes no reference to his being assassinated and simply says, “in the meantime Sultan Djem died unexpectedly.”

Power Relationships between Russia, the Crimea and the Ottoman Empire as Reflected in Titulature

As a system of semiotic symbols designed to declare his place and power in the world, titulature is of paramount significance for a ruler. It defines and asserts in a determined order his power relationship with men and space in his own environment, in the world, and in the cosmos.

In his recent study on the titulature of the Muscovite ruler, Marc Szeftel⁵ presented its evolution as follows: 1) Velikii Kniaz’ of Vladimir, or Grand Prince of Vladimir; 2) Velikii Kniaz’ vseia Rusi, or Grand Prince of all Rus’ (1328); 3) Bozhieiu milostiuur or Dei Gratia (1449); 4) Velikii Gosudar’ or Gospodor (1448, in inter-princely relations, 1489 in international relations); 5) Samoderzhets, or autocrat (1492 by the Church, 1591 in international relations); 6) Tsar’, mid-fifteenth century by the Church, Ivan IV’s coronation as Tsar’ on January 16, 1547; 7) Tsar’ Kazanskii and Tsar’ Astrakanskii (1553, 1554). In 1591 the tsar’s envoys to the king of Poland referred to their ruler in the following manner: Velikii Gosudar’ nazhe Tsar’ i Velikii Kniaz’ Feodor Ivanovich vseia Rusi Samoderzhets.

In view of the Orthodox Church’s authority, guidance, and ceremonial function in introducing and sanctioning such titles, the general tendency has been to assume a Byzantine origin for most of these titles.²

In dealing with royal titulature it is important to determine which title was designed for which audience: whether it was mainly intended for domestic consumption or for international relations, or whether, as in the case of Russia, for the Eastern or Western world. Also it is important in historical analysis to know the particular purpose, historical context and circumstances behind the assumption of a particular title. For Russia the most important and immediate historical reality in power relations was the issue of Tatar suzerainty, not only in the Golden Horde era (1234-1502) but also in the following period.
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